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Abstract
Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial
examples. For the black-box setting, current substitute at-
tacks need pre-trained models to generate adversarial ex-
amples. However, pre-trained models are hard to obtain in
real-world tasks. In this paper, we propose a data-free sub-
stitute training method (DaST) to obtain substitute models
for adversarial black-box attacks without the requirement of
any real data. To achieve this, DaST utilizes specially de-
signed generative adversarial networks (GANs) to train the
substitute models. In particular, we design a multi-branch
architecture and label-control loss for the generative model
to deal with the uneven distribution of synthetic samples.
The substitute model is then trained by the synthetic samples
generated by the generative model, which are labeled by
the attacked model subsequently. The experiments demon-
strate the substitute models produced by DaST can achieve
competitive performance compared with the baseline mod-
els which are trained by the same train set with attacked
models. Additionally, to evaluate the practicability of the
proposed method on the real-world task, we attack an on-
line machine learning model on the Microsoft Azure plat-
form. The remote model misclassifies 98.35% of the adver-
sarial examples crafted by our method. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to train a substitute model for
adversarial attacks without any real data. Our codes are
publicly available 1.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have been shown vulnerable to ex-
amples with imperceptible perturbations [38]. This causes
researchers a high interest in studying attacks and defenses
for assessing and improving the robustness of networks.
Adversarial attack methods can be categorized into two
main attacks, white-box attacks that have full access to the
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1https://github.com/zhoumingyi/DaST
attacked model and black-box attacks that have partial in-
formation of models.
Black-box attacks are more practical in real world sys-
tems compared with white-box attacks. Among these at-
tacks, score-based attacks [8, 19, 20, 16] and decision-based
attacks [3, 9, 7] directly attack the attacked model using
class probabilities or hard labels returned by the attacked
model. These attack methods do not need a pre-trained
substitute model, however, as a cost, they need numerous
queries for attacked models to generate each attack.
Instead, gradient-based attack methods [14, 22, 35, 30]
need knowledge of the architecture and weights of the at-
tacked models. Goodfellow et al. [14] showed that adver-
sarial examples have the property of transferability which
means that adversarial examples generated for one model
through white-box attack methods can also attack other
models. Therefore, to carry out attack methods in the black-
box setting, they use a substitute model to find the adversar-
ial examples and then attack the machine learning model
based on the transferability of these adversarial examples.
Compared with current score-based and decision-based at-
tacks, the substitute attacks do not need queries for gen-
erating adversarial examples. However, they need a pre-
trained model to generate adversarial attacks. Papernot et
al. [34] developed a method that uses a number of images
to imitate the outputs of attacked models to obtain substi-
tute networks. Prediction APIs were also developed to steal
the machine models [39]. Orekondy et al. [32] proposed a
”knockoff” to steal the function of machine learning mod-
els. These methods do not need a pre-trained model but re-
quire many real data labeled by the attacked model to train
a substitute model. However, the real images are hard to get
in some real-world tasks. Therefore, it is important to de-
velop a data-free substitute attack, such that the risks faced
by current machine learning models can be assessed more
comprehensively.
In this study, we propose a data-free substitute training
(DaST) method to train a substitute model for adversarial at-
tacks. We utilize generative adversarial networks (GANs) to
create synthetic samples to train the substitute model. The
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substitute model uses these samples to train, where the la-
bels of the samples are produced by the attacked model. For
the performance, the synthetic samples should be equally
distributed in the input space. The label of samples should
span all categories. However, conventional GANs without
real data may generate samples that have extremely uneven
distribution and only contain few categories, which means
the substitute model cannot learn the classification charac-
teristics of the attacked model comprehensively.
To address this problem, we design a multi-branch archi-
tecture and a label-control loss for the generative model to
deal with the uneven distribution of synthetic samples. The
generative model can produce synthetic samples with ran-
dom labels given by the attacked model. As such, the sub-
stitute model can learn the classification characteristics of
the attacked model in this adversarial training and produce
adversarial examples which have strong transferability for
the attacked model. The main contributions of this study
are summarized as follows:
• We are the first to train a substitute model for adver-
sarial attacks without any real data. Attackers can use
this method to train a substitute model for adversarial
attacks without collecting any real data.
• We evaluate the effectiveness of DaST on both local
deep learning models and the online machine learning
system, which reveals a fact that the current machine
learning model has significant risks to be attacked.
• we evaluate the performance of our method in two at-
tack scenarios, including a probability-only scenario
that attacker can access the output probability of the
attacked model, and a label-only scenario that attacker
only accesses the output label of the attacked model.
Our method generates adversarial examples efficiently
on both scenarios.
In addition, we use different model architectures for the
substitute model to test the influence on attack success rate
caused by the model capacity.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: in section
2, we introduce the related works. The proposed method
is described in section 3. We evaluate the performance of
DaST in section 4.
2. Related Works
Adversarial Scenes Adversarial attacks are carried out
in the white-box setting or the black-box setting. In the
white-box setting, the attacker has access to the structure
and weights of the attacked models. On the contrary, in the
black-box setting, the attacker only has the substitute model
(gradient-based attacks) or access the outputs returned by
the attacked models (query-based attacks). Black-box at-
tack methods are more practical on real tasks.
Adversarial Attacks Gradient-based attacks such as
FGSM [14] and BIM [22] have full access to the models, so
they usually use a pre-trained substitute model to generate
adversarial examples, and then attack the attacked model
using the transferability of adversarial examples. FGSM
aims to find adversarial examples by directly increasing the
loss of the model, BIM is an iterative version of FGSM.
Likewise, DeepFool [30] finds adversarial examples that
are likely to cross the decision boundary. To find pertur-
bations with minimal `p norm, Nicholas Carlini and David
Wagner [6] introduced a method to craft these perturbations
through simultaneously minimizing the perturbations. Sim-
ilar to this method, Rony et al. [36] also constrain the `2
norm of the perturbations, they decoupled the value and di-
rection of the perturbation. In the black-box setting, these
attacks rely on the transferability of adversarial examples.
However, Liu et al. [25] showed that these examples nearly
have no transferability on attacked attacks. Instead, Cheng
et al. [8] proposed a score-based attack method zeroth order
based attack (ZOO) using gradient estimation, and Ilyas et
al. [20] improve the way of the gradient estimation. Instead
of gradient estimation, Guo et al. [16] introduced a simple
black-box attack (SimBA) which decides the direction of
the perturbations based on the changes of output probabil-
ity. Brendel et al. [3] first proposed a decision-based attack.
Based on this method, Cheng et al. [9] and Cheng et al. [7]
improved the query efficiency, which is an important metric
for black-box attacks.
Adversarial Defenses Several defense methods for in-
creasing the robustness of models have been proposed. Ad-
versarial training [38, 27, 23, 40] modifies the training
schemes of the models, they directly train with the adver-
sarial examples. Another method aims to modify the ad-
versarial examples themselves such as random transforma-
tion [22, 28, 41]. Buckman et al. [4] proposed a nonlinear
transformation based on one-hot encoding to inputs of mod-
els. Gradient masking methods [40, 10] destroy the gra-
dient information so that they fail the optimization-based
attacks. However, these defense methods based on gradi-
ent masking have been showed unreliable [1], and mod-
els with defenses above are still unsafe against some at-
tacks [5, 17]. Besides, detecting adversarial examples raises
the interest of researchers. Some of them detect the exam-
ples of whether they are adversarial or clean by an auxiliary
network [13, 15, 29], while some find out adversarial exam-
ples through their statistical properties [2, 18, 12, 26, 33].
3. Method
In this section, we describe the attack scenario in this
study, then introduce the substitute attack and propose a
data-free method to train the substitute model.
3.1. Attack Scenario
Label-only scenario Suppose the attacked machine
learning model is employed online and attackers can freely
probe the output labels of the attacked model. The attack-
ers are hard to obtain any data which is in the input space
of the attacked model. We name the proposed DaST on the
label-only scenario as DaST-L.
Probability-only scenario The other settings of this sce-
nario are the same as the label-only scenario, but attackers
can access the output probability of the attacked model. We
name the proposed DaST on the probability-only scenario
as DaST-P.
3.2. Adversarial Attack
In this subsection, we introduce the definition of adver-
sarial substitute attacks.
X denotes samples from the input space of the attacked
model T . y¯ and y′ refers to the real labels and the target
labels of the samples X, respectively. T (y|X, θ) is the at-
tacked model parameterized by θ. For non-targeted attacks,
the objective of the adversarial attack can be formulated as:
min

‖‖ subject to argmax
yi
T (yi|X=X+, θ) 6= y¯
and ‖‖ ≤ r.
(1)
For targeted attacks, the objective is:
min

‖‖ subject to argmax
yi
T (yi|X=X+, θ) = y′
and ‖‖ ≤ r,
(2)
where the  and r are perturbation of the sample and upper
bound of the perturbation, respectively. For attacking the
machine learning system which is hard to detect, r is set
to a small value in attack methods. X = X +  are the
adversarial examples which can lead the attacked model T
to output a wrong label (non-targeted setting) and a specific
wrong label (targeted setting).
For white-box attacks, they can fully access the gradient
information of T , then use it to generate adversarial exam-
ples to attack the T . For black-box substitute attacks, they
train a model T̂ to substitute the attacked model to gener-
ate adversarial examples and then transfer the examples to
attack the T . The attack success rate of these black-box at-
tacks heavily relies on the transferability of the adversarial
examples. Therefore, the key point of developing an ef-
ficient substitute attack is to train a substitute model hav-
ing properties that are as similar as possible to the attacked
model. Current attack methods utilize the same training set
of the attacked model or collect a lot of other images labeled
by the attacked model to train the substitute model. In the
next two subsections, we will introduce a method that can
train a substitute model without any image. The whole pro-
cess is shown in Figure 1.
3.3. Adversarial Generator-Classifier Training
In this subsection, we introduce the basic adversarial
training method and discuss its limitation.
For training the substitute model without any image, we
use a generative model G to produce training data for the
substitute model D. The generator randomly samples the
noise vector z from the input space and produces the data
X̂ = G(z). Then, the generated data is used to probe the
output T (X̂) of the attacked model T . The substitute model
is trained by the image-output pair (X̂, T (X̂)). As shown
in Figure 1, the objective of G is to create new samples to
explore the difference between T and D, and the role of
D is to imitate the output of T . It is a special two-player
game, the attacked model involved in this game is a referee.
To simplify the expression but without loss of generality,
we utilize the binary classification as a case to analyze (the
output probability can be considered as one scalar in binary
classification, so does the output label). The value function
of the game is presented as:
max
G
min
D
VG,D = d(T (X̂), D(X̂)) (3)
where d(T (X̂), D(X̂)) is a metric to measure the output
distance between T and D. For label-only attack scenario,
this measurement can be formulated as:
d(T,D) = CE(D(X̂), T (X̂)), (4)
where D(X̂) and T (X̂) in this scenario denote the out-
put labels of the substitute model and those of the attacked
model, respectively. CE(D(X̂), T (X̂)) denotes the cross
entropy loss, and the output labels of T are utilized as the la-
bel of this loss. The function of cross entropy loss is to con-
strain the difference between the T and D. For probability-
only attack scenario, this measurement is formulated as:
d(T,D) = ‖D(X̂), T (X̂)‖F , (5)
where D(X̂) and T (X̂) in this scenario denote the output
probabilities of the substitute model and those of the at-
tacked model, respectively.
Hence the substitute model D replicates the informa-
tion of attacked model T by this adversarial training. In
the training, the loss function of D is set to LD = VG,D.
In order to maintain the stability of training, the loss func-
tion of G is designed as LG = e−d(T,D). Therefore, the
global optimal substitute network D is obtained if and only
if ∀ X̂, T (X̂) = D(X̂). At this point, LD = 0 and
LG = e0 = 1.
…Deconvolutional layer
Convolutional layer
Generative model 
(G)
obj: T Dy y
Substitute model 
(D)
obj: T Dy y=
Attacked model 
(T)
Ty
Synthetic data
G
1L
NL
Figure 1. The proposed adversarial data-free imitation. The architecture of G is shown in the blue dotted block. N denotes the number of
categories. In the training stage, the objective of G is to generate samples X̂ = G(X) and let yD(X̂) 6= yT (X̂). The objective of D is to
guarantee yD(X̂) = yT (X̂). In the testing stage, the substitute model D is utilized to generate adversarial examples to attack T .
We suppose that ∀ X̂ = G(z), X̂ ∈ R, R is the input
space of T . If the D can achieve D(X̂) = T (X̂), the adver-
sarial attacks carried out by our substitute model will have
the same success rate as the white-box attack without the
gradient information of T . Therefore, for a well-trained
substitute network, adversarial examples generated by D
have strong transferability for T .
However, it is impossible to guarantee that D(X̂) =
T (X̂) in a limited time. If we do not constrain the output of
G, the synthetic training data for T is likely only distributed
in a small range of R, thus this training cannot work. For
addressing this problem, we design a label-controllable ar-
chitecture for G, which can control the distribution of syn-
thetic data and speed up the convergence of training.
3.4. Label-controllable Data Generation
In this subsection, we introduce the label-controllable ar-
chitecture for the generative model G.
To obtain equally distributed synthetic data to train the
substitute model D, we consider developing a method that
can control the distribution of X̂. For training a replication
of T , the synthetic data is used to probe the information of
the attacked model. The label of samples, which is pro-
duced by the attacked model, should span all categories.
Therefore, as shown in the blue dotted box of Figure 1,
we design a generative network which contains N upsam-
pling deconvolutional components,N is the number of cate-
gories. All upsampling components share a post-processing
convolutional network. The modelG randomly samples the
noise vector z from the input space and variable label value
n. The z is then entered into the n-th upsampling decon-
volutional network and the shared convolutional network to
produce the data X̂ = G(z, n). The additional label-control
loss for generative model G is formulated as:
LC = CE(T (G(z, n)), n). (6)
The above method generates data with random labels,
which are produced by T . However, the back propagation of
this label-control loss needs the gradient information of the
attacked model T , it violates the rules of black-box attacks.
We need to train a label-controllable generative model with-
out the gradient information of T . For the imitation process,
it can be approximated as the following objective function:
min
D
d(T (X̂), D(X̂)). (7)
In the training progresses, the outputs of D will grad-
ually approach the outputs of T under the same inputs.
Therefore, we use D to replace the T in Eq. (6), which
is formulated as:
LC = CE(D(G(z, n)), n). (8)
The training of substitute D can avoid accessing the infor-
mation of T . Then we update the loss of G as:
LG = e−d(T,D) + αLC , (9)
where α controls the weight of label-control loss (we set it
to 0.2 in our experiments).
In the training stage, as the imitation ability of D in-
creases, the diversity of synthetic samples which is labeled
by the T will enhance. Therefore, the D can learn the in-
formation of the attacked model T , which can improve the
transferability of adversarial examples generated by D. We
Algorithm 1 Mini-batch stochastic gradient descent
training of the proposed method DaST.
# acc denotes the accuracy of D. att denotes the attack
success rate for the attacks generated by D.
1 : While iteration < δ or acc, att do not increace
2 : Generate m examples{X̂(1), . . . , X̂(m)}by G.
3 : Update the substitute model :
4 : LD = d(T (X̂), D(X̂)).
5 : Update the generative model :
6 : LG = e−d(T,D) + αLC .
7 : end for
name this method as data-free substitute training (DaST),
which is shown in Algorithm 1.
Like the current substitute attack methods, the substitute
model trained by our method is utilized to generate adver-
sarial examples to attack T .
4. Experiments
4.1. Experiment Setting
In this subsection, we introduce our experiment settings,
including the datasets, model architectures, attack methods,
and evaluation criteria.
Dataset: we evaluate our proposed method on MNIST
[24] and CIFAR-10 [21]. The test sets of these two datasets
have 10k images, respectively.
Scenario: we evaluate our method in both label-only at-
tack and probability-only scenario. The DaST-L and DaST-
P denote the DaST in the label-only scenario and DaST in
the probability-only scenario, respectively. Attackers in the
scenarios of this study can freely access the output of the
attacked model. Therefore, we obtain the substitute model
trained by DaST when the algorithm convergence.
Model architecture and attack method: the substitute
network has no prior knowledge of the attacked model,
which means it does not load any pre-trained model in ex-
periments. For the experiments on MNIST, we design 3 dif-
ferent network architectures including a small network (3
convolutional layers), a medium network (4 convolutional
layers) and a large network (5 convolutional layers) for eval-
uating the performance of our DaST with models having
different capacity. We utilize the pre-trained medium net-
work and VGG-16 [37] as the attacked model on MNIST
and CIFAR-10, respectively. In addition, we use different
architectures for the substitute model and attacked model
to evaluate the impact of model structure on our method in
CIFAR-10 experiments. In order to compare the substitute
model produced by DaST with the pre-trained models, we
utilize 4 attack methods to generate adversarial examples,
which include FGSM [14], BIM [22], projected gradient
Table 1. Performance of the proposed DaST on MNIST. “Pre-
trained”, “DaST-L” and “DaST-P”: the attack success rate (%) of
adversarial examples generated by the pre-trained large network
and DaST-L and DaST-P, respectively. ( ) denotes the average LF
perturbation distance per image.
Attack Non-targeted
Pre-trained DaST-P DaST-L
FGSM [14] 59.72 (5.40) 69.76 (5.41) 35.74 (5.40)
BIM [22] 85.70 (4.80) 96.36 (4.81) 64.61 (4.82)
PGD [27] 37.93 (3.98) 53.99 (3.99) 23.22 (3.98)
C&W [6] 23.34 (2.91) 27.35 (2.74) 18.16 (2.75)
Attack Targeted
Pre-trained DaST-P DaST-L
FGSM [14] 12.10 (5.46) 20.45 (4.49) 13.10 (5.46)
BIM [22] 37.83 (4.90) 57.22 (4.87) 29.18 (4.87)
PGD [27] 28.95 (4.60) 47.57 (4.63) 19.25 (4.63)
C&W [6] 10.32 (2.57) 23.80 (2.99) 12.31 (2.98)
descent (PGD) [27], C&W [6]. For testing, we use Ad-
verTorch library [11] to generate adversarial examples. For
evaluating performances of the proposed method in real-
world tasks, we apply our attack to the online MNIST model
of Microsoft Azure. The training tricks and machine learn-
ing methods utilized by this online model cannot be ac-
cessed.
Evaluation criteria: for evaluating the performance of
our DaST, we set the attack success rates of adversarial ex-
amples generated by other pre-trained networks as the base-
line. The goals of non-targeted attacks and targeted attacks
are to lead the attacked model to output wrong labels and
specific wrong labels, respectively. In the non-targeted at-
tack scenario, we only generate adversarial examples on the
images classified correctly by the attacked model. In tar-
geted attacks, we only generate adversarial examples on
the images which are not classified to the specific wrong
labels. The success rates of adversarial attack are calcu-
lated by n/m, where n andm are the number of adversarial
examples which can fool the attacked model and the total
number of adversarial examples, respectively.
4.2. Experiments on MNIST
In this subsection, we employ the proposed DaST to train
a substitute model for adversarial attacks on the MNIST
dataset and evaluate the performance in terms of attack suc-
cess rate in label-only and probability-only scenarios.
First, we conduct experiments to evaluate the perfor-
mance in probability-only and label-only attack scenarios.
We use the medium network as the attacked model on
MNIST and the large network as the substitute model of
DaST. We train a pre-trained large network on the same
train set of the attacked model. We utilize the attack success
Table 2. Performances of the proposed DaST with three different
substitute architectures on MNIST. “Small”, “Medium” “Large”:
the attack success rates (%) of adversarial examples generated by
DaST with small, medium and large substitute networks, respec-
tively. ( ) denotes the average LF perturbation distance per image.
Attack Non-targeted
Small Medium Large
FGSM [14] 62.61 (4.38) 56.21 (4.45) 69.76 (5.41)
BIM [22] 94.86 (4.85) 92.47 (4.84) 96.36 (4.81)
PGD [27] 45.31 (3.99) 43.62 (3.99) 53.99 (3.99)
C&W [6] 30.61 (2.89) 24.34 (2.75) 23.80 (2.99)
Attack Targeted
Small Medium Large
FGSM [14] 19.92 (4.43)) 20.45 (4.49) 23.93 (5.45)
BIM [22] 56.73 (4.89) 53.50 (4.84) 57.22 (4.87)
PGD [27] 39.42 (4.64) 40.76 (4.60) 47.57 (4.63)
C&W [6] 24.86 (3.09) 16.25 (3.13) 23.80 (2.99)
rate of adversarial examples generated by the pre-trained
model as the baseline. The performances of our DaST are
shown in Table 1.The substitute model trained by DaST-
P and DaST-L achieve 97.82% and 83.95% of accuracy on
the test set, respectively. The attack success rates of the sub-
stitute model produced by our DaST are higher than those
of the pre-trained model on non-targeted (10.04%, 10.66%,
16.06%, and 4.01% higher on FGSM, BIM, PGD, and
C&W, respectively) and targeted attacks (11.83%, 19.39,
18.62, 13.48% higher on FGSM, BIM, PGD, and C&W,
respectively). It shows that the substitute model generated
by DaST-P outperform the models trained by the same train
set (60000 images) with the attacked model. Even he substi-
tute models trained by DaST-L perform better than baseline
models on FGSM and C&W attacks (targeted).
Then we evaluate the performances of our DaST with
different substitute architectures in the probability-only sce-
nario. We also use the medium network as the attacked
model on MNIST and apply our DaST using three different
substitute architectures, which include the large, medium
and small networks. The attack success rates of these three
substitute architectures are shown in Table 2. The large sub-
stitute model achieves the best results on FGSM, BIM, PGD
attacks compared with other models. The small substitute
model obtains the best results on C&W attacks compared
with other models. It shows that both architectures for the
substitute model obtain good results on adversarial attacks.
In general, the substitute models with more complex struc-
ture can obtain better performance for adversarial attacks.
4.3. Experiments on CIFAR-10
In this subsection, we employ the proposed DaST to train
a substitute model for adversarial attacks on the CIFAR-
Table 3. Performance of the proposed DaST on CIFAR-10. “Pre-
trained”, “DaST-P” “DaST-L”: the attack success rates (%) of ad-
versarial examples generated by the pre-trained large network,
DaST-P and DaST-L, respectively. ( ) denotes the average LF per-
turbation distance per image.
Attack Non-targeted
Pre-trained DaST-P DaST-L
FGSM [14] 39.10 (1.54) 39.63 (1.54) 22.65 (1.54)
BIM [22] 59.18 (1.01) 59.71 (1.18) 28.42 (1.19)
PGD [27] 35.40 (1.02) 29.10 (1.10) 17.80 (1.10)
C&W [6] 9.76 (0.77) 13.52 (0.74) 10.34 (0.74)
Attack Targeted
Pre-trained DaST-P DaST-L
FGSM [14] 9.62 (1.54) 6.69 (1.54) 7.32 (1.54)
BIM [22] 17.43 (1.00) 20.22 (1.18) 15.26 (1.16)
PGD [27] 10.46 (1.05) 14.09 (1.12) 8.32 (1.10)
C&W [6] 23.15 (2.05) 26.53 (1.98) 19.78 (2.04)
10 dataset, and evaluate the performance in terms of attack
success rate in label-only and probability-only scenarios.
We conduct experiments to evaluate the performance in
probability-only and label-only attack scenarios and use the
VGG-16 network as the attacked model. We train a pre-
trained ResNet-50 network on the same train set of the at-
tacked model. The performances of our DaST are shown
in Table 3. The substitute model trained by DaST-P and
DaST-L achieve 25.15% and 20.35% of accuracy on the
test set, respectively. Our DaST also achieves competitive
performance with the pre-trained model. In most cases of
the probability-only scenario (FGSM, BIM, C&W for non-
targeted attack, BIM, PGD, C&W for targeted attacks), the
substitute models generated by DaST-P outperform baseline
models. The substitute models trained by DaST-L perform
better than baseline models on C&W attacks (non-targeted).
We also evaluate the performances of our DaST with dif-
ferent substitute architectures in the probability-only sce-
nario. The VGG-16 network is used as the attacked model.
We apply our DaST using 3 different substitute architec-
tures, which include the VGG-13, ResNet-18, and ResNet-
50. The attack success rates of these three substitute ar-
chitectures are shown in Table 4. It demonstrates that both
architectures for the substitute model obtain good results on
adversarial attacks. In most cases (BIM, PGD, C&W for
non-targeted attack, FGSM, BIM, PGD, C&W for targeted
attacks), the VGG-13 outperforms other models in terms
of the adversarial attack. The ResNet-50 obtains the best
results on FGSM attacks (targeted). Different from experi-
ments on MNIST, the simple model achieves the best results
on CIFAR-10. We visualize the adversarial examples gener-
ated by DaST-P and DaST-L in Figure 2 and 3, respectively.
The attack perturbations for these two scenarios are small.
Table 4. Performances of the proposed DaST with three different
substitute architectures on CIFAR-10. “VGG-13”, “ResNet-18”
“ResNet-50”: the attack success rates (the high is better) of ad-
versarial examples generated by DaST with VGG-13, ResNet-18
and ResNet-50 substitute models, respectively. The numbers in ( )
denote the average LF perturbation distance per image.
Attack Non-targeted (%)
VGG-13 ResNet-18 ResNet-50
FGSM [14] 6.87 (1.54) 17.97 (1.54) 39.63 (1.54)
BIM [22] 93.13 (1.18) 31.70 (1.54) 59.71 (1.18)
PGD [27] 56.14 (1.08) 10.04 (1.11) 29.10 (1.10)
C&W [6] 56.80 (1.64) 11.54 (1.64) 13.52 (0.74)
Attack Targeted (%)
VGG-13 ResNet-18 ResNet-50
FGSM [14] 18.27 (1.54) 2.07 (1.54) 6.69 (1.54)
BIM [22] 62.23 (1.24) 8.00 (1.52) 20.22 (1.18)
PGD [27] 41.48 (1.17) 3.72 (1.26) 14.09 (1.12)
C&W [6] 33.65 (2.42) 7.31 (1.46) 26.53 (1.98)
FGSM
BIM
CW
PGD
Figure 2. Visualization of the adversarial examples generated by
DaST-L on CIFAR-10. We generate 5 samples for each attack.
4.4. Experiments on Microsoft Azure
In this subsection, we conduct experiments for attacking
the online model on Microsoft Azure in two scenarios.
We use the example MNIST model of the machine learn-
ing tutorial on Azure as the attacked model and employ it
as a web service. We do not know the machine learning
method and architecture of this model. The only informa-
tion we can obtain is the outputs of this model. We apply
the probability-based DaST and label-based DaST attacks
to this model to evaluate the performance of the proposed
method in real-world applications. The substitute model
in this experiment has 5 convolutional layers. The substi-
tute model trained by DaST-P and DaST-L achieve 79.35%
Table 5. Performance of the proposed DaST for attacking Mi-
crosoft Azure example model. “Pre-trained”, “DaST-P” “DaST-
L”: the attack success rate (the high is better) of adversarial
examples generated by the pre-trained large network, DaST in
probability-only scenario and DaST in label-only scenario, respec-
tively. The numbers in ( ) denote the average LF perturbation dis-
tance per image. Because it hard to generate adversarial examples
for all methods on C&W [6], we omit this attack method.
Attack Non-targeted (%)
Pre-trained DaST-P DaST-L
FGSM [14] 77.96 (5.41) 96.83 (5.25) 98.21 (5.36)
BIM [22] 66.25 (4.81) 96.42 (4.79) 98.35 (4.72)
PGD [27] 59.23 (3.99) 90.63 (3.88) 96.97 (3.96)
Attack Targeted (%)
Pre-trained DaST-P DaST-L
FGSM [14] 13.52 (5.46) 32.00 (5.21) 43.99 (5.37)
BIM [22] 19.31 (4.88) 50.21 (4.90) 71.15 (4.56)
PGD [27] 19.31 (4.60) 45.66 (4.46) 65.91 (4.32)
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Figure 3. Visualization of the adversarial examples generated by
DaST-P on CIFAR-10. We generate 5 samples for each attack.
and 90.75% of accuracy on the MNIST test set, respec-
tively. The performance on adversarial attacks of the pro-
posed method is shown in Table 5.
The performance of DaST-L is better than its of DaST-P
on this online model. Because the attacked Azure model
is too simple, the accuracy on MNIST is only 91.93%.
Figure 6 shows the training of DaST-P, which can access
more information of attacked model than DaST-L, suffers
over-fitting. DaST-L substitutes achieve a very high at-
tack success rate on FGSM (98.21%), BIM (98.35%), PGD
(96.97%) attacks. Moreover, our DaST method achieves a
high attack success rate even on targeted attacks. Compared
with the models trained by the MNIST train set, substitute
models trained by DaST perform much better on label-only
Table 6. Comparison of DaST and other attacks. ”ASR”: attack
success rate. ”Query”: the number of queries in the evaluation
stage. ”Boundary”: Decision-Based Attacks [3]. ”GLS”: a score-
based black-box attack based on greedy local search [31]. ”-” de-
notes our DaST does not need query in the evaluation stage. The
DaST in this experiment generate attacks with BIM.
Attack ASR Distance Query
DaST-P 96.83% 4.79 -
GLS [31] 40.51% 4.27 297.07
DaST-L 98.35% 4.72 -
Boundary [3] 100% 4.69 670.54
(20.25%, 32.10%, 37.74% higher on non-targeted FGSM,
BIM, PGD attacks, respectively. 30.47%, 51.84%, 46.60%
higher on targeted FGSM, BIM, PGD attacks, respectively)
and probability-only scenarios. It presents that our ap-
proach is better at attacking actual online models, even the
proposed method does not need any real data. Because
DaST does not need any query in the evaluation stage but
needs queries in the training stage, our DaST requires differ-
ent information than score-based attacks and decision-based
attacks (they need queries in the evaluation stage). We
show the number of queries for score-based and decision-
based attacks, which have similar perturbation distance with
DaST in non-targeted attacks. The results are shown in
Table 6. Our DaST is trained by 20,000,000 queries for
the attacked model in the training stage. Compared with
decision-based and score-based attacks, the input each time
the DaST accesses the attacked model is different in the
training stage (current query-based attacks need to use one
original data to access the attacked model numerous times
to generate each attack). So the queries of DaST are harder
to be tracked than other attacks.
Visualization: we visualize the synthetic samples gener-
ated by the generative model in DaST on Azure experi-
ments, which is shown in Figure 4. We also visualize the
adversarial examples generated by DaST-P and DaST-L in
Figure 5. The attack perturbations of DaST are small.
Training convergence: We show the curve of attack suc-
cess rate of BIM attacks generated by DaST in the training
stage of Azure experiments, which is shown in Figure 6.
The attack success rates for DaST-L and DaST-P converge
after 20,000,000 and 2,000,000 queries, respectively.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a data-free method DaST to train
substitute models for adversarial attacks. DaST reduces
the prerequisites of adversarial substitute attacks by utiliz-
ing GANs to generate synthetic samples. This is the first
method that can train substitute models without the require-
ment of any real data. The experiments showed the effec-
a b
azure
Figure 4. Visualization of the synthetic samples generated by the
generator in the training of DaST. Left: samples generated by the
DaST-L. Right: samples generated by the DaST-P.
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Figure 5. Visualization of the adversarial examples generated by
DaST for attacking the Azure model. Left: examples generated by
DaST-P. Right: examples generated by DaST-L.
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Figure 6. Attack success rate of BIM attacks generated by DaST
in training stage of Azure experiments.
tiveness of our method. It presented that machine learning
systems have significant risks, attackers can train substitute
models even when the real input data is hard to collect.
The proposed DaST cannot generate adversarial exam-
ples alone, it should be used with other gradient-based at-
tack methods. In future work, we will design a new sub-
stitute training method, which can generate attacks directly.
Furthermore, we will explore the defense for DaST.
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